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THE STRUCTURAL PUBLIC GOVERNANCE MODEL 
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira 
ABSTRACT 
 
To grow, nation states need a capable and efficient state organization. Independently of 
choosing a market or state led growth strategy, an effective or capable state is essential 
to guarantee the rule of law and to act as main instrument of a national growth 
strategy. On the other hand, in the global economy, the provision of the social and 
scientific services required by modern societies at low cost is key in assuring the 
country’s international competitiveness. What type of public administration reform 
achieves these goals? Is public management reform instrumental to it, or should 
developing countries first complete classical civil service reform, and only after that 
engage in a more ambitious reform? This article opts for the first alternative, arguing 
that the best way to advance civil service reform is to move ahead. Second, it presents 
the ‘structural public governance model’ of public management reform that was 
originally conceived in the 1990s in and for Brazil based on the British experience. It is 
a managerial model because it makes public managers more autonomous and more 
accountable, and because it reduced the gap between the public and the private labor 
market; it is structural, because it involves major changes in the structure of the state, 
particularly the set up of autonomous executive and regulatory agencies and the 
contracting out of social and scientific services. The model of public management 
reform presented here is neutral in distributive terms as well as in terms of the size of 
the state organization in so far as it can be and is being adopted by center left as well as 
center right political coalitions. Reforms adopting basically the structural governance 
model here described are being actively being implemented in the developed countries 
since the 1980s. In the 1990s, some developing countries also engaged in public 
management reform. The model cannot be exported, but it can be imported by 
developing countries provided that they keep the ownership of it, i.e., that they put the 
reform high the national agenda, and that they adapt it to the local conditions, giving 
special attention to the formation of a small but competent and well paid senior civil 





Economic development is possible only when a nation-state can count on an effective 
state. Private entrepreneurs will provide most of the investment, but a capable state will 
be crucial in creating the institutional and economic conditions for capital accumulation 
and growth. Today it is common knowledge that institutions are central to promoting 
economic development. The state itself is the central institution in modern societies; it is 
an organization that gives rise to normative institutions. Besides being capable of 
democratically constructing an adequate legal framework for the achievement of 
society’s goals, the state or public administration must be effective and efficient in 
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providing the services that voters demand of it. If these assumptions are accepted, some 
questions arise concerning the organization and management of the state. In this article, 
my questions will be: What kind of organization or public administration makes for a 
capable state? Just a professional civil service? Or are contemporary ideas related to 
public management reform – specifically, to what I will call the ‘structural public 
governance model’ – also part of the package even for developing countries?  
For this kind of question there are no simple or definite answers, but, since they are 
loaded with ideology, a candid discussion of them may clarify the issues. If what is 
needed is just a Weberian type of bureaucracy, consisting of well-selected and well-
trained professionals acting without discretion in law enforcement, and a hierarchical 
and centralized organization with defined lines of authority, there is no need for this 
article. But if, besides a professional civil service, modern states require senior civil 
servants to have more discretion and to be more accountable for their decisions, and the 
organization of the state to be more decentralized and involve all sort of partnerships, 
we have a problem that is worthy of an article.  
Center-left academics tend to believe that public management reform is intrinsically 
neo-liberal and hostile to the social state, probably because this type of reform began in 
the United Kingdom in the mid-1980s when a conservative government was in power, 
and also because some of its first proponents were conservative in political terms. Is this 
true? Or, as I will argue, is public management, on the contrary, a neutral instrument 
which can be used by a conservative administration that wants to dismantle the social 
state but also by a progressive administration that is concerned with a more equal 
distribution of income in society? Again, since this reform was originally adopted by 
developed countries, is it inapplicable to developing countries? Should they faithfully 
observe the sequencing rule – first complete civil service reform and only then tackle 
public management reform? I will argue here that the sequencing rule is misguided, and 
that there is no reason why civil service reform should not be combined with public 
management reform. This, for instance, is the experience of Brazil, a country that since 
1995 has been involved in progressive public management reform at federal, state and 
municipal levels.1 But I will not discuss specific reforms in this article. Rather, I will 
present a specific model of public management reform – the structural public 
governance model – and, on this basis, I will discuss its possible progressive or 
conservative character, and its appropriateness to developing countries. 
I call this model of public management reform the ‘structural public governance model’ 
in so far as it includes structural reform of the state organization, in addition to major 
changes in the process of managing personnel and achieving objectives. Public 
management reform is the second major administrative reform experienced by the 
modern capitalist state. In its first version, the modern state was absolutist, and adopted 
a patrimonial administration. In the second part of the nineteenth century, the more 
advanced capitalist countries undertook the first major administrative reform – civil 
service or bureaucratic reform.2 This represented immense progress. Yet, after Word 
                                                 
1 The reform in Brazil began when the newly called Ministry of Federal Administration and Reform of 
the State (MARE) got approved by the Presidential Committee of the Reform of the State the White 
Paper on the Reform of the State Apparatus (MARE, 1995). 
2 On that reform, besides Max Weber’s classical work
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War II, the countries that were using the state as an instrument to promote economic 
development realized that public administration needed to be more flexible. In 
consequence, state investments were channeled to state-owned enterprises, and some 
agencies were created endowed with some degrees of autonomy. These were attempts to 
make the state organization more flexible and, for that reason, more effective in 
promoting economic development. Yet it was only in the 1980s that it became clear that 
such developmental attempts would only make sense if they were accompanied by a 
new form of managing the state organization: new public management. With this, a 
second major reform of the state apparatus was beginning. The first countries to 
recognize this necessity and embark on public management reform were the United 
Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.  
There are many accounts of the new public management that emerged from the reforms 
in these three countries, which were soon followed by others, including Brazil. The 
modern literature on new public management, or just public management, is substantial. 
In this article I will define the structural public governance model, based on the 
Brazilian experience of public management reform since 1995, when a social 
democratic administration took office, and on the British experience, which served as 
the principal reference for Brazil’s. The structural public governance model is an 
historical model because it uses an historical method, drawing from the experience of 
countries that undertook the reform, and seeks to generalize from its main 
characteristics. Yet it is also a normative model because it is impossible not to be 
normative on questions that involve political theory and public policy – specifically the 
reform of the state organization.3 It is a model of public management reform which 
should be considered by other developing countries as a tool for their economic growth. 
It is a structural model because, as we will see, it is not limited to management 
strategies but involves more than organizational changes: it implies changes in the state 
structure, because all kinds of public-private partnerships are involved, because the 
social and scientific services that society requires the state to provide are contracted out 
to non-state organizations. It is a governance model because it involves other actors 
besides the government itself in the governing process. 
 
 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECT OF THE STRUCTURAL PUBLIC 
GOVERNANCE MODEL 
The structural public governance model includes an organizational aspect and a 
management or accountability aspect.  On the one hand is the problem of how to 
structure or organize the state services, what the strategic core of the state should do,  
what to delegate to agencies, and which services to contract out; on the other hand is the 
question of how to manage the whole system – a matter of process rather than of 
structure.  
The organizational aspect of the structural public governance model deals not with the 
role of the state but with its structure. In the nineteenth century, Marx said that the state 
                                                 
3 For the Brazilian reform, see Bresser-Pereira and Spink, eds. (1998), Bresser-Pereira (2004). For the 
reform in the OECD countries, see Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000). 
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was the ‘executive committee of the bourgeoisie’. At that time he might well have been 
right, but in contemporary democracies the state is, rather, society’s main instrument of 
collective action: it is the basic tool that national societies use to achieve their political 
goals. Business elites continue to have a major influence, but the middle class and even 
the poor have a say. Together, and despite the conflict between them, they constitute the 
nation, and the more developed a country or nation-state is, the more able the nation is 
to use the state as an instrument to achieve its political objectives (social order, liberty, 
well-being, justice, and protection of the environment) in a competitive global 
economy. In modern democracies the role of the state is ultimately decided by the 
voters and the politicians they elect. They will decide whether the state should secure 
social rights in terms of education, health care, culture, and social security, as well as 
how the government will support national economic development. Yet they probably 
will not get involved directly in the more technical discussion of how the state should be 
organized. Once having decided politically on the role of the state, citizens will need to 
give the state an efficient structure consistent with that role. The structural public 
governance model that I will present aims to achieve this requirement, with the 
advantage that it is relatively neutral in ideological terms: it will work for a social 
democratic state, but also for a neo-liberal one. Yet, to be efficient and general, the 
model does not limit itself to the state apparatus. Its structural character requires a larger 
horizon, encompassing the different critical activities that are performed by the state and 
by other social actors in a modern nation-state, and the basic types of ownership and 
corresponding organizations that characterize modern societies.  
First, we have four distinct types of ownership and corresponding organization: (a) state 
ownership, (b) public non-state ownership, (c) corporatist ownership, and (d) private 
ownership. The distinction between public and private is not based on the type of law to 
which the organization is subject (public or private law), but on the organization’s 
objectives: if the objective is profit, it is private; if it is the public interest, it is public; if 
it is the defense of group interests, it is corporatist. In order to distinguish state from 
public non-state organizations, a second criterion – in this case a legal one – is required. 
If the employees of a public organization are subject to civil or private law, the 
organization is public non-state – it is public because not-for-profit and oriented to the 
public interest, but not part of the state organization; if it is subject to public or 
administrative law, if its employees are ‘statutory civil servants’, we have a state 
organization – and such an organization is part of the state apparatus. According to this 
second criterion, universities like the University of California, despite being called 
‘state universities’, are not state but public non-state organizations, because their 
employees are not public servants whose salaries are decided at government level and 
guaranteed by the state. Among public non-state organizations, it is necessary to 
distinguish service organizations, which provide principally education, health care and 
social assistance, from political advocacy or social accountability organizations, 
although some of them, such as Oxfam, perform both roles. The distinction between 
public non-state and corporatist organizations is important because the former are 
supposedly concerned with the public interest,
4
 while the latter, of which trade unions 
                                                 
4 Many ‘supposedly’ public non-state organizations are, in fact, private since they effectively sponsor 
private interests. This is just one distortion among the many in all social systems.  
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and professional associations are the best examples, explicitly defend group interests 
which may or may not coincide with the public interest. Among public non-state 
organizations, the social accountability or political advocacy organizations (also called 
stricto senso ‘non-governmental organizations’ - NGOs), together with corporatist ones, 
form the modernly called ‘organizations of civil society’. If we add to them the public 
non-state service organizations, the sum of this non-profit organizations form the ‘third 
sector’ (also called the ‘associative sector’ or the ‘social sector’).  
Second, the organizational aspect of the structural public governance model 
distinguishes several basic forms of activity involving production and the exercise of 
power which are carried out in a modern society: (1) the specific activities of the state 
involving the exercise of state power and the management of state resources or of tax 
revenues, which require a further distinction between (1.1) the core activities of policy 
formulation and (1.2) the implementation of policies still requiring the use of state 
power; (2) the activities of social advocacy or social accountability; (3) the provision of 
social and scientific services which society decides that the state is responsible for, such 
as health care, education, scientific research, and cultural promotion; (4) the defense or 
promotion of corporatist interests; and (5) the production of goods and services for 
competitive markets.  
(Table 1 insert here) 
Given these two basic classifications – of forms of ownership and of activities – the 
model suggests the types of organizations which are supposed to perform the different 
activities. The exclusive activities of the state, involving the use of state power and 
policy formulation, will be performed by secretaries or departments at the strategic core 
of the government where politicians and senior civil servants work together. The 
implementation of policies still involving state power will be the responsibility of 
administratively autonomous executive and regulatory agencies. The latter will also 
have some political autonomy in so far as they are supposed to regulate prices and 
quality in oligopolist industries ‘as if’ the respective market was competitive: in 
principle, they are not supposed to define other policies, which will remain the 
prerogative of elected officials. Social and scientific services supported by the state, like 
hospitals, museums, universities, and research centers, will be delivered by public non-
state organizations. If they are contracted out by government they are (or should be 
called) ‘social organizations’;
5
 if they are principally financed by the private sector, 
‘charities’ is probably the best word to characterize such service organizations. Finally, 
producers of goods and services for the market are supposed to be privatized, except 
when they are natural monopolies, as in the case of urban water supply.  
Table 1 summarizes the organizational aspect of the model. It implies a set of decisions: 
some are self-explanatory, other involve major debate. For instance, why contract out 
social and scientific services to non-profit service organizations rather than letting them 
be delivered directly by the state? Because they are non-exclusive activities of the state 
                                                 
5 The expression ‘social organization’ was used in the Brazilian Public Management Reform of 1995–98 
in a federal and several state and municipal laws. 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 8   ·  Issue 1  ·  2007  ·  © International Public Management Network 
21 
 
(activities that the other three sectors can also execute), and will be more efficiently 
performed by autonomous social organizations under contract and duly made 
accountable to society and to the government. Why not contract them out to private 
enterprise? Because the information asymmetries that pervade the markets for such 
services are huge, and because major human rights issues are involved. In any case, 
while in sectors such as university education or hospitals the advantages of contracting 
out to social organizations are clear and reform should be expedited, in other sectors, 
such as basic education, change will have to be gradual. While we have an example of 
extremely successful use of public non-state organizations in the US university system, 
no country supplies a similar example in the area of basic education. There is no doubt 
that reform will work in the direction of more flexible public non-state systems, but 
such reform will need to be piecemeal. 
Thus, the structural public governance model involves state, public non-state, 
corporatist and private organizations. Since these organizations are increasingly 
interdependent, forming all kinds of networks, public management models are often 
identified with public-private-third sector partnerships. The expression is not wholly 
adequate because it plays down the state, as if it was not endowed with the powers 
which led Max Weber to define it as ‘the monopoly of legitimate power’. Yet the 
concepts of partnership and network are useful to underline that the state is not 
supposed to perform directly all the roles or responsibilities that voters and the law 
attribute to it. As governments have been able to contract out construction and other 
auxiliary services to business firms, they can contract out the delivery of social and 
scientific services to public non-state organizations without renouncing their 
responsibilities. 
This contracting out or outsourcing has interesting consequences in terms of the size of 
the state apparatus. If one defines the size of the state by the number of people directly 
hired, the state will be small: the state will just hire high-level senior civil servants, 
recruited among the best young talent at society’s disposal, well trained, well paid, and 
from whom will be required not only an appropriate republican ethos but high standards 
of competence. Yet, if the size of the state is defined by the tax burden or total state 
expenditures in relation to GDP, it may remain large if society decides to continue 
having a social or welfare state. The state organization contracted out service delivery 
only, and retained responsibility for their finance and performance.  
What is the logic behind such division of roles between the state and society in the 
supply of basic social and scientific services, with the state financing and controlling the 
services, and public non-state service organizations providing them? The state has such 
a strategic role in society that it should retain only those activities which are specific or 
exclusive to it – activities which involve state power, such as policy-making, defining 
the major institutions organizing the whole society, and guaranteeing security for its 
members. These roles are monopolistic and need on the one hand to be performed by 
high-level personnel, and on the other hand to be fully accountable to society. While the 
services themselves must be offered efficiently, these are strategic roles performed 
directly by government and must be effective and of high quality. These roles relate to 
ideas and decisions, not products and services, which is why they require some of the 
best talents of each society. This is also why, despite the use of high-level personnel, the 
actions taken within the state organization require a costly system of accountability. 
Although the social and scientific services are not exclusive to the state, society may 
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(and, in my view, should) finance crucial social and scientific services that society 
decides to make freely or quasi-freely available to all. The acting of financing the 
service organizations and of making them accountable to the state is also an exclusive 
activity of the state, in so far as the civil servants performing this role are using tax 
revenue resources. In contrast, implementing the policies and supplying social and 
scientific services financed by the state, do not need the direct involvement of statutory 
civil servants. Although also complex, these are substantially simpler activities. Their 
outcomes may be more objectively quantified and compared. In certain cases, the 
activities may be subject to an accounting process based on administered competition 
for excellence. Both facts reduce the control costs involved. On the other hand, these 
service activities require a flexibility that the state organization does not have, whatever 
the management practices it adopts. Thus, they may be more efficiently delivered by 
public non-state service organizations.  
 
THE MANAGEMENT ASPECT AND THE NEW FORMS OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Besides the organizational aspect, the structural public governance model that I am 
discussing has a specifically management aspect. The objective is to make the 
administration more flexible and the managers more motivated. Most of the ideas 
originated in the management practices developed during the twentieth century by 
private organizations. The management aspect emphasizes ‘client-citizen’ oriented 
action, and two of its three specific accountability mechanisms – administration by 
objectives and administrative competition for excellence – were borrowed from 
business administration. This should not be misunderstood. The principles that orient 
public management continue to flow from political theory and political science rather 
than business management. The objective is the public interest, not profits; the 
coordination system is administrative and legal, rather than performed by the market. 
And the third specific accountability mechanism – social accountability performed by 
political advocacy organizations – is exclusive to the public realm. Following Ranson 
and Stewart’s (1994) concerns, we are speaking of a ‘management for the public 
domain’, not for the private one. When one speaks of citizen-client orientation in this 
context, there is no reduction of the citizen to a consumer, but a fuller recognition of the 
citizen’s rights. 
To express in a nutshell the managerial character of the model, I would say that public 
management reform seeks to make civil servants more autonomous and more 
accountable: more autonomous from strict regulations and direct supervision, and more 
accountable to the strategic core of the state and to society. Another way of putting it  
would be that public management reform is a process of decentralization – of delegation 
of authority to lower levels, while making the strategic core of the state stronger and 
social accountability mechanisms more effective. Yet the decentralization does not go 
all the way: a central characteristic of public management reform is to separate policy 
formulation, which remains centralized, from execution, which is decentralized. Still 
another way of explaining public management reform is to think not in terms of 
government but of governance. The English term ‘government’ is often confused with 
‘state’, but even in other languages, where such confusion does not arise, it is useful to 
distinguish ‘government’ from ‘governance’. Government, as an entity, is formed by the 
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top decision-making bodies of the state; as a communications flow, it is the decision-
making process of public officials (politicians and senior public servants). Governance 
involves also a process, but a larger one, as it conveys the idea that public non-state 
organizations or organizations of civil society, business firms, individual citizens, and 
international organizations also participate in the decision-making process, although the 
government remains the central actor.  
Since public management reform represents a further step in relation to civil service 
reform, it adopts a new form of control or accountability. While the three classical 
bureaucratic forms of accountability are exhaustive regulations, direct hierarchical 
supervision, and auditing mechanisms, the three typical managerial forms are 
management by outcomes or objectives, administered competition for excellence, and 
social accountability. The three new forms do not overturn the classical ones but only 
partially replace them. Management by results is a form of decentralization: the 
supervisory secretary defines the objectives and the performance indicators with the 
participation of the agency or of its manager, who is assured the administrative 
autonomy – personal and financial – to achieve them. Administrative competition for 
excellence does not mean market coordination of public services but compares the 
standards or benchmarks achieved by different public organizations that deliver the 
same service in different regions. The difference in relation to management by 
objectives is that the standards or performance indicators emerge from the effective 
accomplishments of the different agencies or services rather than from a management 
contract, which would have to define such performance indicators somewhat arbitrarily, 
based only on previous experience. Social accountability means the use of civil society 
organizations, including councils of citizens, to keep public services and public officers 
under control. 
Under public management reform, decentralization is achieved by the transfer of service 
provision to agencies and social organizations. Policy formulation remains centralized, 
but the central authority is able to delegate powers in so far as it is able to use 
managerial accountability mechanisms effectively. While bureaucratic control 
mechanisms imply a centralized organization, managerial accountability mechanisms 
are consistent with decentralization – a decentralization that does not mean reducing but 
increasing managerial control over outcomes. This is true because this type of 
managerial decentralization is just a provisional delegation of authority: the central 
manager retains the option of reversing it whenever it is not working.
6
 It is quite 
different from the political decentralization involved in transferring fiscal resources 
from the central state to the provinces or local municipalities. Such an option may also 
be good for large nation states, but is not easily reversed. Often it is rather the outcome 
of a political demand rather than of a government strategy. For that reason, the issue of 
the federal versus the unitary state should not be confused with public management 
reform.  
                                                 
6 A common mistake is to suppose that it reduces the control of the central authorities over the state 
organizations, in so far as public management reform involves decentralization. On the contrary, their 
power, including the power of the authorities in the finance ministry that control expenditures, actually 
increases, because objectives are attained with smaller costs. They relinquish some direct controls to 
obtain a greater indirect control.  
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Public management involves strategic planning. While in bureaucratic administration 
planning is limited to the law and regulation, without individual cases or possible 
responses from adversaries being taken into account, managerial planning involves a 
detailed definition of the processes to be followed and of the strategies to be adopted, 
depending on the responses. Thus, public management reform does not imply less 
managerial work but often more, despite involving decentralization. This is so true that 
one distortion that may easily arise is that of excess and costly planning.  But, if this 




Public management extensively uses information technology, which is able to deliver 
enormous labor savings besides allowing for large economies in the state’s purchasing 
activity. Yet one should not identify public management reform with the use of 
information technology. Independently of the type of administration – managerial or 
bureaucratic – such a major innovation would be used by the state. In the case of 
managerial accountability mechanisms, well-used information technology makes further 
decentralization viable. 
Only within a democratic framework is it possible to accept the high degree of 
autonomy assigned to managers in public management reforms. While bureaucratic 
public administration was created within a liberal but not democratic state, and was 
concerned with strict controls, public management reform is unthinkable without 
democracy. The autonomy that the public manager assumes, the possibility of making 
decisions instead of just executing the law, is checked a posteriori by managerial 
accountability mechanisms, particularly by the social accountability mechanism 
involving pressure for more transparency and an increased investigative role on the part 
of the media. Given that public management reform presupposes democracy, and that 
the values related to the autonomy of civil servants are well integrated in society, their 
formal tenure or stability can be made more flexible, more similar to that which exists 
in the labor market.
8
 Their pay may and should be also more flexible, reflecting their 
performance. It should also be higher because the salaries of public managers would be 
competitive with salaries of the private sector, in so far the private and the public labor 
market cease to be separated (while the wages of non-skilled public servants would tend 
to equalize with the correspondent jobs in the private sector).
9
 They will be made 
accountable through public management accountability mechanisms rather than through 
                                                 
7 In the managerial reform of the British National Health Service undertaken initially by the conservative 
administration this problem arose, but eventually it was reasonably overcome as the continuation of the 
reform by the labor administration (which, while in opposition, criticized it) show.   
8 In Brazil there was no flexibility of entrance examinations because the country had not achieved the 
reasonable degree of equalization of the public and private labor markets which is required for such 
flexibility to work well.. 
9 In bureaucratic administrations, like the French or the Brazilian one, salaries of public managers tend to 
be smaller than salaries of private ones, while wages of low level public servants tend to be higher than 
their counterpart in the private sector. With public management reform, this difference gradually 
disappears. 
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bureaucratic ones. Finally, in the managerial system, the republican civil service ethos, 
so important for this type of job, will be better assured than in the bureaucratic one, 
because public managers will be few in number, well-paid and highly prestigious. 
This possibility is challenged by many, particularly by adherents of public choice 
theory, which, transferring to the public sphere the economists’ view of the behavior of 
businessmen competing in the market, see civil servants as ignoring the public interest. 
They would just make trade-offs between rent-seeking and occupation of higher 
positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy (which could be endangered by the rent-seeking), 
as politicians would just make trade-offs between rent-seeking and the desire to be 
reelected. This is a smart assumption when one wants to give mathematical precision to 
the political sciences: political actors’ behavior would be as predictable as economic 
agents’ behavior in the market. Yet such a simplifying assumption grossly misconceives 
political and bureaucratic behavior, which, unlike economic behavior, is motivated not 
only by private interests but also by the public interest.
10
 Given the different 
expectations involving the behavior of businessmen on the one hand and of politicians 
and civil servants on the other, the social legitimacy involved will differ as between the 
two areas. While the businessman may legitimately be guided by private interests, the 
public official cannot, because society does not accept such an approach. Thus, given 
the demands of society, it is reasonable to expect from a small group of prestigious civil 
servants, chosen from among the brightest young people of each society, that they will 
able to establish and conform to high standards of republican behavior. 
As I asked in relation to the type of structure, I now ask, in relation to this form of 
administration: what is the underlying the logic? Why give public officials more 
autonomy and make them more accountable? First and foremost, because we are 
speaking of public managers with entrepreneurial qualities whose motivation depends 
on their autonomy. Motivation in the state as well in private organizations does not 
depend only on economic incentives, or on the republican ethos: it depends also on the 
satisfaction of a basic need of entrepreneurial personalities, a need to achieve. 
Competent managers are achievement-motivated. They want power to do things, and 
they need autonomy to do them. Second, because more autonomy means the possibility 
of adapting actions to complex and changing conditions – conditions that strict 
regulations cannot predict. If the risks involved in such higher autonomy are minimized 
by new forms of accountability, its efficiency advantages are obvious. 
 
IMPORTING INSTITUTIONS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The structural public governance model, like all ideal types, is not fully present in 
reality, but in one way or another it is being developed by most rich countries, except 
Germany, France, Spain and Japan. Some questions follow. Does the model reduce the 
influence of civil servants who, in the patrimonial administration of the absolutist state, 
                                                 
10 This does not mean that the assumption of full rationality is acceptable for economic behavior: it just 
means that in this area, depending on the level of abstraction, it may make sense. 
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share power with the dominant aristocratic class, and, in the bureaucratic administration 
of the liberal state, were allied to the entrepreneurial class, and played a major role in 
formulating and implementing national strategies of growth? If the answer to these 
questions is negative, would this model of state reform have, as a trade-off, the effect of 
concentrating income or increasing inequality? And, if this question also receives a 
negative answer, is the model applicable to developing countries? 
The first question is central, because reforming the state organization makes sense only 
if it contributes to enhancing state capacity – and, if it does, it will increase the prestige 
and influence of the public officials, both politicians and senior civil servants, who 
manage it. The assumption behind this claim is that, historically, economic development 
was possible only after the first industrialized countries realized their ‘national 
revolution’, that is, the building of capable states. The state, as the nation’s instrument 
of collective action, is a prerequisite for economic growth, initially because it offers 
secure internal markets to entrepreneurs, and generally because the existence of a state 
(organization and institutions) enables a nation to achieve its main political goals, 
particularly economic development. A nation is essentially a society or a group of 
people sharing a common destiny and using the state as their key instrument of 
collective action. Historical experience shows that only a nation-state formed out of a 
strong or cohesive nation and a capable state is able to devise and follow a national 
strategy of economic growth. 
Public management reform, understood in terms of the structural public governance 
model, is essentially aimed at increasing the state’s capacity to guarantee social and 
republican rights without incurring the inefficiencies that characterized the twentieth- 
century bureaucratic welfare state. The idea is not to replace the social state by an 
‘enabling state’, as neo-liberal thinking proposes; it is not to consider the social state 
‘paternalistic’ in so far as it establishes safety nets, and to replace it by a form of state 
that ‘empowers individuals to compete in the market’. People must indeed be prepared 
to compete, but they also need protection, require security – particularly the weaker and 
the less able. It is true that, in some cases, policies adopted in the name of public 
management reform weakened the state instead of making it stronger. This was the case 
in New Zealand in the 1990s, during a few years of conservative administration after the 
Labour Party started the reform. But the conservatives lost the subsequent election, and 
the reform was resumed on reasonable terms. The central economic idea of reforming 
the state is to make better use of tax revenues – to provide better services at lower cost – 
or, in other words, to make the state organization more efficient in the use of money that 
is always relatively scarce.  
The reform does not discuss how the government can be more legitimate – this is a 
question of political or democratic reform – but it indirectly contributes to the 
legitimacy of the political system as a whole. It is interested in knowing how 
governments, how elected and non-elected public officials at the strategic core of the 
state take the decisions that improve governance, but its specific realm is the 
organization and management of the state. On the one hand, it proposes a criterion for 
the division of labor among state, public-non state, corporatist, and private 
organizations; on the other hand, it suggests policies to make public managers more 
motivated and more efficient by making them autonomous and accountable. In the 
competitive capitalist world in which we live, efficiency is required everywhere. Thus, 
there is a saying – ‘do not throw good money after bad’ – which is often used to reject 
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paying taxes and financing needed social services. A state organization which 
undergoes public management reform becomes more efficient and, for that reason, more 
capable and more legitimate. 
With public management reform, senior public servants working principally in the 
strategic core of the state become also more respected. Since they are used to classical 
bureaucratic principles, civil servants usually start by distrusting new ideas. Yet reform 
will be successful only if it can count on their support and initiative. In fact, most public 
management reform in the last 20 years was effective when senior civil servants 
realized that such reform represented an opportunity for competent civil servants – 
when they understood that the old bureaucratic practices were weakening the state and 
demoralizing the civil service, and decided to engage in reform. In modern capitalist 
societies, a state organization is legitimate, and its personnel respected, when it is an 
effective instrument for economic growth. It was the practical confirmation of this that 
made it possible for the original public management reforms in the United Kingdom, 




Once we accept that public management reform strengthens the state, increases the 
legitimacy of the democratic regime, and promotes economic growth, the next question 
is whether this is achieved at the cost of more social inequality. Given that the reform 
reduces the number of non-managerial jobs in the state bureaucracy, and assumed that 
these low level jobs tend to be better-paid than the correspondent jobs in the private 
sector, some concentration will occur. On the other hand, as it allows the state to devote 
those resources to increasing social services, it works in favor of redistribution. It is 
important to notice that, since the 1970s, we have lived in a time of income and wealth 
concentration – of rising inequality in all capitalist countries. This has been mainly a 
consequence of the information technology revolution, which increased the demand for 
skilled labor while reducing the demand for non-specialized work, and of the neo-liberal 
ideological wave, which after the 1970s pushed for a reduction of the welfare state, or 
the indirect wage. Public management reform was viewed by many as an element of this 
process, but the fact is that it increased the capacity of the state to provide efficiently 
social services which, being basically universal, contribute to social equality. In fact, 
public management reform is neutral in distributive terms. It may be used either to 
reduce or to increase direct and indirect wages. Yet, in so far as it increases state 
capacity, it also legitimizes increases in the state’s social expenditures, and so makes it 
more probable that a country that adopts it will be better able to assure social rights.  
Our third and last question: wouldn’t public management reform be too ambitious for 
developing countries? Shouldn’t they follow the sequencing process that is so dear to 
                                                 
11 The survey by Pollitt and Bouchaert (2000), confirmed in the 2004 edition of the book, is definitive on 
this subject.  
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international organizations such as the World Bank?
12
 Should they not first complete 
civil service reform, and only then get into public management reform? The response 
that immediately comes to mind is to agree provided that my interlocutor also agrees 
that the country should first complete the nineteenth century mechanical revolution, and 
only after that engage in the information technology revolution… If this answer is too 
impatient on my part, another way of putting the problem is to argue that, if the country 
lacks a sufficiently professional Weberian bureaucracy, this is no reason for not 
beginning public management reform: both reforms may be implemented at the same 
time. Developed countries already had competent senior civil services, and could 
proceed from that position. 
The fact that the sequencing hypothesis is often mistaken does not mean that developing 
countries should copy strictly the public management reforms adopted by developing 
countries. They will have to consider the specificities that they face, they will have to 
admit that clientelism or pork-barrel practices will be more widespread, that society will 
be less cohesive and that its moral standards will be lower. In the case of the 1995 
Brazilian public management reform which was based on the British model, for 
instance, several several adaptations were introduced by the local reformers. The role of 
senior civil servants at the strategic core of the state received more attention, their 
salaries were increased, yearly public entrance examinations were established for all 
state careers
13
, and the role of auditing was not underestimated, although auditors were 
asked to pay more attention to outcomes than to procedures. Training of senior and 
middle-level civil servants received priority. In other words, there is no reason why a 
developing country cannot continue to build its professional public administration 
while, at same time, it starts to implement public management reform.  
One of the major advantages that developing countries enjoy, besides the possibility of 
copying technologies, is the capacity to ‘import’ institutions. International organizations 
insist on exporting institutions and reforms, but such exports often fail because they are 
not adapted to local conditions. Importing institutions is quite different, because it 
implies ownership of the institutions being imported by nationals who will be able not 
only to adapt them to local conditions but also to commit people – other senior servants 
and society in general – to the new rules of the game. Commitment to new institutions 
does not follow automatically from ownership of the reform by nationals, but it is a 
condition for it. What is certain is that institutional reforms – and public management is 
nothing more than a set of institutions – are effective only when, besides being well 
designed and adapted to real conditions, they are ingrained in the social texture.  
                                                 
12 Still in 1998 the World Bank understood administrative reform as downsizing the state organization 
and completing civil service reform. At that time, its staff was just beginning to understand what was 
meant by public management reform, but still did not support it, based on the sequencing argument.  
13 Previously, only the diplomacy and the military careers had yearly entrance examinations. 
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I began this article by asking what kind of public administration reform in developing 
countries would contribute to economic development and the achievement of the United 
Nations’ MDGs. After describing a model of public management reform which I called 
the structural public governance model, I argued, first, that it made the state more 
capable and more efficient in so far as it adopted a particular structure of division of 
labor between the state organization itself, public non-state, corporatist and private 
organizations, and adopted a managerial strategy which, by making senior civil servants 
more autonomous and more accountable, motivated them and allowed them to be more 
efficient. Second, I argued that, in so far as the state is the key instrument of collective 
action at a nation’s disposal for promoting its economic development, making it more 
capable certainly would make governments more effective in defining, along with 
society, a national strategy of growth. Third, I rejected the sequencing thesis, 
maintaining that, if a developing country had not completed its bureaucratic or civil 
service reform, there was no reason why it could not continue with this reform while 
gradually implementing public management reform. 
Developing countries can be divided into middle-income and low-income categories. I 
have no doubt that middle-income or intermediate developing countries are able to 
import institutions and profit from that. What is dangerous for them is to accept 
uncritically exported institutions which often do not take account of their national 
interests. In relation to the poor countries, however, the problem is more complex, and 
more doubts than certitudes are the advisable attitude. More than other countries, they 
need above all else to build a strong, capable state, because a reasonably well-structured 
and relatively corruption-free state is a condition for their profiting from the aid that 
they receive from rich and middle-income countries. The whole program that the United 
Nations organized to channel aid to poor countries is based on the assumption that some 
of those countries have already met such minimum conditions. The UN Millennium 
Project’s main document (2005) asserts that ‘it is the responsibility of countries 
themselves to strengthen their own government systems’. It divides poor countries into 
those headed by ‘rapacious government leadership’ and those provided with ‘well 
intentioned governments’, and proposes that developed countries direct 0.7 % of their 
GDP to aid the later group of countries.
14
 In any case, they have no alternative but to try 
to build state capacity for them. To achieve that, they should resist financing growth in 
any way with additional international indebtedness, because growth comes out of 
domestic not foreign savings.
15
 And they should be critical of the recommendations and 
                                                 
14 UN Millennium Project (2005): 113-114. The Millennium Project was commissioned by the United 
Nations Secretary-General in 2002 to develop a concrete action plan for the world to abolish the grinding 
poverty, hunger and disease affecting billions of people. It is an independent advisory body headed by 
Jeffrey Sachs. See also Sachs (2005). 
15 On the critique of growth cum foreign savings strategy in the last years, see Bresser-Pereira and 
Nakano (2002). 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 8   ·  Issue 1  ·  2007  ·  © International Public Management Network 
30 
 
conditionalities that usually come together with aid. With these caveats, the structural 
public governance model, well adapted to their realities, will be a good institution to 
import.  
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